

CommonWealth REIT  
Form DFAN14A  
April 18, 2013

**UNITED STATES**  
**SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION**

Washington, D.C. 20549

**SCHEDULE 14A**

**Proxy Statement Pursuant to Section 14(a) of the**  
**Securities Exchange Act of 1934**

Filed by the Registrant

Filed by a Party other than the Registrant

Check the appropriate box:

Preliminary Proxy Statement

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Definitive Proxy Statement

Definitive Additional Materials

Soliciting Material Pursuant to §240.14a-12

**COMMONWEALTH REIT**

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(Name of the Registrant as Specified In Its Charter)

**CORVEX MANAGEMENT LP**

**KEITH MEISTER**

**RELATED FUND MANAGEMENT, LLC**

**RELATED REAL ESTATE RECOVERY FUND GP-A, LLC**

**RELATED REAL ESTATE RECOVERY FUND GP, L.P.**

**RELATED REAL ESTATE RECOVERY FUND, L.P.**

**RRERF ACQUISITION, LLC**

**JEFF T. BLAU**

**RICHARD O TOOLE**

**DAVID R. JOHNSON**

(Name of Person(s) Filing Proxy Statement, if other than the Registrant)

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(3) Filing Party:

(4) Date Filed:

This filing contains (1) a press release issued by Corvex Management LP ( Corvex ) and Related Fund Management, LLC ( Related ) on April 18, 2013, (2) a presentation disseminated by Corvex and Related on April 18, 2013, and (3) screenshots from a website hosted by Corvex and Related.

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**CORVEX AND RELATED SEND LETTER TO COMMONWEALTH REIT SHAREHOLDERS**

**CALLING FOR AN END TO VALUE DESTRUCTION**

**Urgent Need to Remove Entire Commonwealth Board Now and Stop Accelerating Campaign to**

**Disenfranchise Shareholders**

**Vote the WHITE Consent Card Today**

**NEW YORK, April 18, 2013** Corvex Management LP ( Corvex ) and Related Fund Management, LLC ( Related ), whose separately managed investment funds collectively own approximately 9.2% of the outstanding common shares of Commonwealth REIT (NYSE:CWH), today sent a letter to CWH shareholders, urging them to vote the WHITE consent card and remove the entire Board of Commonwealth before it can take any additional action to destroy shareholder value.

Corvex and Related have also published an investor presentation detailing their plan for driving value and restoring shareholder wealth at Commonwealth and outlining the latest actions of CWH's Board that they firmly believe have destroyed shareholder value. The presentation is available at [www.shareholdersforcommonwealth.com](http://www.shareholdersforcommonwealth.com).

Shareholders are urged to sign, date and return the WHITE consent card today. You may also be able to vote online by following the instructions on the voting materials you will be receiving. They also encourage all shareholders to call today D.F. King & Co., Inc., their proxy solicitor, at 1-800-714-3313 so they can ensure you receive their materials and they can assist you in voting your shares.

The text of the letter to CWH shareholders is as follows:

**IMMEDIATE CHANGE IS NEEDED TO STOP THE CONTINUED VALUE DESTRUCTION**

**AT COMMONWEALTH**

**OUR CONSENT SOLICITATION WILL SERVE AS A REFERENDUM ON THE CURRENT**

**BOARD AND MANAGEMENT TEAM AND IS THE ONLY WAY TO EFFECT REAL CHANGE**

**SIGN, DATE AND RETURN THE WHITE CONSENT CARD TODAY!**

Dear Fellow Shareholders:

We are two of the largest shareholders of Commonwealth REIT with a combined ownership of 9.2%, and are seeking written consents from shareholders to immediately remove all members of Commonwealth's board of trustees. Commonwealth is managed by Reit Management & Research LLC (RMR), which is owned by Barry Portnoy and his son Adam. The Portnoys, along with their hand-picked trustees, have in our view managed Commonwealth in a way which has enriched themselves rather than representing the interests of shareholders. **If we do not act NOW to remove the entire board, management will continue its unrestrained and accelerating campaign of value destruction, and shareholders will be forced to endure many more years of mismanagement.**

We made a substantial investment in Commonwealth earlier this year after conducting an exhaustive property-by-property study of Commonwealth and its assets under the lead of Related Fund Management, an affiliate of Related Companies – one of the most respected

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privately-owned real estate firms in the world with over \$15 billion of real estate assets and a 40 year history.

Based on Related's extensive due diligence and expert analysis, and with the assistance of highly qualified external consultants, we recognized that Commonwealth's real estate assets trade at a substantial discount to fair value due to a misalignment of incentives between RMR and shareholders, and what in our view is plain mismanagement by the Portnoys and the trustees. Specifically, the flawed RMR structure reduces the Company's cash flow, impairs Commonwealth's valuation multiple (40%+ discount to peers historically), destroys investor confidence, and has resulted in a track record of underperformance. In fact, Commonwealth is one of the few remaining externally managed equity REITs in the public markets. Green Street Advisors, a leading real estate and REIT research firm, refers to this structure as a "dinosaur" that stands out like a sore thumb.<sup>1</sup> We firmly believe this external manager structure must be removed and replaced with an internal management team that is truly focused on creating value for **ALL** shareholders.

Since announcing our ownership stake in late February, we have sought to effect change, and have consistently remained open to multiple options to create value for all shareholders. However, it is clear to us that the current board of trustees and management are solely beholden to the Portnoys, do not recognize or ignore the inherent conflicts of interest that the external manager structure creates, and will not act in a way that seeks to enhance value for all shareholders.

In fact, in response to our efforts, Commonwealth has shown that it will stop at nothing to silence us and other shareholders. Within the past seven weeks alone Commonwealth's management and board have: completed a massively dilutive equity offering at a 48% discount to book value; amended the governing documents of Commonwealth twice in an attempt to eliminate long-standing shareholder rights; announced the possibility of selling Commonwealth's controlling stake in Select Income REIT at a discount; secretly lobbied the Maryland legislature in an attempt to introduce amendments that would have eliminated shareholder democracy; and, most recently, purported to completely eliminate shareholder rights to remove trustees without cause—an effort that in our and our lawyers' view is invalid under Maryland law. If any shareholders had doubts as to where the trustees' allegiances lie, these actions have made clear it is to the Portnoys and not shareholders.

Given the accelerating pace of Commonwealth's value-destroying activities, we are left with no alternative but to seek to immediately remove this board. **The only way for shareholders to effect meaningful change is through our consent solicitation**. Any other strategy would take years to make a difference as a result of the various entrenching devices built into Commonwealth's governing documents.

**MISMANAGEMENT OF COMMONWEALTH BY THE CURRENT BOARD AND  
MANAGEMENT TEAM HAS RESULTED IN SEVERE UNDERPERFORMANCE**

It is our firm view that the Portnoys' collective actions have led to Commonwealth significantly underperforming its peers on almost all key metrics, including:

**Worst shareholder returns**—Commonwealth's stock price has performed 28%, 31%, and 30% worse than peers over the last 1 year, 3 years, and 5 years, respectively.<sup>2</sup> Over the same 1 year, 3

<sup>1</sup> The Portnoy REITs—What It Means to be Uninvestable, Green Street Advisors, March 1, 2013. Permission was neither sought nor obtained to include quoted language.

<sup>2</sup> Commonwealth's peers include Piedmont Office Realty Trust Inc. (PDM), Highwoods Properties Inc. (HIW), Mack-Cali Realty Corp. (CLI), Brandywine Realty Trust (BDN) and Parkway Properties Inc. (PKY). Returns calculated through January 15, 2013, the day prior to when Corvex and Related began purchasing stock.

year, and 5 year time periods, Commonwealth's total return performance, which is calculated based on stock price performance and dividends, is 26%, 26%, and 22% below peers, respectively.

**Massive discount to peers** Commonwealth's share price was trading at a nearly 40% discount to its peers on an unlevered capitalization rate basis immediately prior to the public announcement of our ownership stake on February 26, 2013. Commonwealth has also traded at a 40%+ discount to peers on a price/FFO basis over the last 1 year and 3 years, respectively.

**Mismanagement of operations** Commonwealth has consistently delivered negative growth in both FFO/share (-5% 2010-2012 CAGR) and CAD/share (-23% 2010-2012 CAGR) and is among the bottom performers of peers on both metrics.

**THE PORTNOYS AND THEIR TRUSTEES HAVE ENGAGED IN AN ACCELERATING**

**CAMPAIGN TO DISENFRANCHISE SHAREHOLDERS**

**AND DESTROY VALUE**

Since we first called for change seven weeks ago, the Portnoys, aided by their trustees, have executed a self-serving campaign aimed at advancing their own financial interests, at the expense of shareholder rights and value. This campaign has included:

***Completing a Highly Dilutive Equity Offering:*** This past March, the board completed a dilutive equity offering at a time when Commonwealth's shares were trading at a 48% discount to book value as of December 31, 2012, in order to repay debt trading at prices ranging from 102% to 111% of par. The offering increased Commonwealth's share count by 41% and **diluted its NAV by over \$6 per share.**

***Disenfranchising Amendments to Governance Documents:*** Just last month, following the announcement of our investment in Commonwealth, the board has unilaterally decided to make various amendments to Commonwealth's bylaws that, on their face, sought to effectively eliminate shareholders' right to act by written consent. As previously stated, such amendments conflict with the Commonwealth charter and Maryland law and therefore we believe they are invalid as a matter of law.

***Eleventh-Hour Lobbying Efforts to Change the Law:*** Not satisfied, earlier this month the Portnoys hired a team of political consultants likely paid for by YOU, as CWH shareholders to secretly lobby the Maryland legislature in a failed attempt to adopt an eleventh-hour amendment to a pending bill that would have deprived shareholders of their right to act by written consent to remove the board without cause.

***Bylaw Amendment to Try to Eliminate Shareholders' Right to Remove Trustees Without Cause:*** Having failed to change the law in Maryland through their lobbying efforts, the Portnoys and their trustees have recently announced an additional unilateral amendment to Commonwealth's bylaws that purports to eliminate the right shareholders have had since 1986 to remove trustees without cause. They have done this through a novel interpretation of the Maryland corporate statute which flies in the face of 14 years of public disclosures by Commonwealth. It is our and our lawyers' view that such amendment is invalid.

***Proposed Sale of the Company's 56% Controlling Interest in Select Income REIT (SIR):*** On March 25, 2013, the board announced that it was contemplating selling Commonwealth's 56% controlling equity interest in SIR in an underwritten offering, which we anticipate would be



completed at a discount to market price and would effectively transfer control away from Commonwealth while allowing RMR to continue extracting fees from SIR. In our view, any sale of shares constituting a control position in SIR, however, should reflect a control premium free of the existing restrictive management contract, not a discount.

**We must act now. If shareholders don't act now to remove the entire board, we will be subject to at least three more years of Portnoy mismanagement the minimum time needed to replace a simple majority of Commonwealth's super-charged staggered board. WE MUST ACT BEFORE THE PORTNOYS AND THEIR TRUSTEES TAKE ANY ADDITIONAL ACTION TO DESTROY SHAREHOLDER VALUE.**

**SIGN, DATE AND RETURN OUR WHITE CONSENT AND TAKE THE FIRST STEP TO**

**ELECT A NEW BOARD OF INDEPENDENT AND HIGHLY QUALIFIED TRUSTEES**

Once the current trustees are removed, Commonwealth is required to promptly call a special meeting for shareholders to elect new trustees. We will engage in an active dialogue with all shareholders to identify a truly independent slate of highly qualified nominees focused on real estate industry veterans with pristine credentials who are prepared to work for the interests of ALL shareholders, not just the Portnoys.

Upon removal of the current board, we are prepared to leverage our substantial resources and real estate expertise to benefit all shareholders. CBRE, the world's largest commercial real estate services firm, has agreed to provide interim property management and leasing services to the Commonwealth portfolio as long as necessary to ensure a smooth change of guard to a new independent and properly functioning board elected by shareholders. Additionally, Jim Lozier, a well-respected real estate executive with more than 20 years of experience and co-founder and former CEO of Archon Group L.P., a subsidiary of Goldman Sachs and a diversified international real estate services and advisory company, has agreed to serve as interim CEO until a new board is appointed. During Jim's tenure at Archon, the company grew from 320 employees to 8,500 employees managing 36,000 assets with a gross value of approximately \$59 billion. As interim CEO, Jim will focus on transition of management services, continuity of financial reporting and building out a permanent management team. We have also already engaged Deutsche Bank Securities Inc. as financial advisor and we expect to work with Deutsche Bank Securities Inc. on any required financing in connection with our effort. Make no mistake, we will be prepared to move immediately with a more professional and aligned real estate team from the moment shareholders regain control from the Portnoys.

**CORVEX AND RELATED HAVE A PLAN FOR**

**DRIVING VALUE AND RESTORING SHAREHOLDER WEALTH**

We are proposing Commonwealth take the following simple, yet decisive actions:

**Internalize Management Structure**, and transition to having its own management team instead of relying on the conflicted, overpaid services of RMR or another external manager. We note that RMR has received over **\$336 million just in the last five years from Commonwealth**, while managing at least 5 other entities in the Portnoy Empire and engaging in over \$2 billion of related party transactions at Commonwealth alone. **During the same period Commonwealth has seen its stock decline by over 49% and cut its dividend by 70%.**

**Adopt Corporate Governance Best Practices**, amending Commonwealth's existing charter and bylaws to improve them and conform to ISS and Glass Lewis best practices, increasing rights for all shareholders Commonwealth's board should no longer be insulated by a classified board, a poison pill with a slow hand provision and other entrenchment devices.

**Cease Affiliate Transactions With, Or Managed By, RMR**, which we believe are resulting in the transfer of enormous value to RMR and the Portnoys at YOUR expense.

**Cease all acquisition and development activity** until Commonwealth's stock price exceeds its NAV, and use excess cash flow to buy back Commonwealth's undervalued shares until its stock price exceeds NAV

**Manage Commonwealth in ways which maximize long-term shareholder value**, not fees paid to RMR.

As a sign of our commitment to Commonwealth, and to offer an alternative path to unlock value, we delivered to the board a bona fide offer to acquire up to 100% of the outstanding shares for \$24.50 in cash. We also encouraged the Company to welcome any additional offers from other potential bidders in excess of \$24.50 per share in cash. We are focused on liberating Commonwealth from the Portnoys any way we can, and believe an acquisition with an option for existing shareholders to retain their equity is one way to achieve this goal. We very much believe there is higher value that can be unlocked if Commonwealth were run by the proper internal management team. As such, we are open to the idea of allowing fellow shareholders to retain their equity in order to share significant upside potential of Commonwealth under qualified management. So far the board of trustees, despite having received our firm offer at a premium of 55% to the share price on the day before we announced our position, has refused to engage in any good faith negotiations with us regarding this option, and has instead rejected our offer in favor of a so-called strategic plan which has led to a 45% stock price decline in the last two years.

Signing, dating and returning the **WHITE** consent card will send a firm and unequivocal message to the board that the time has come for them to be held accountable to shareholders. **THIS PROCESS PRESENTS A CLEAR PATH FOR ALL SHAREHOLDERS TO EFFECT CHANGE NOW AND PARTICIPATE IN ELECTING REPLACEMENT TRUSTEES WITHOUT THE OVERSIGHT OF A SELF-INTERESTED BOARD.**

**We are encouraged by the support we have received over the past weeks from many shareholders from large institutional holders, who have publicly stated their support for what we stand for, to small retail holders, who have seen their IRA accounts diminish in value as a result of the Portnoys' mismanagement. Now is the time for all of us to act.**

We note that, unless the entire board is **removed**, **any remaining trustees will have the ability to fill vacancies created by the removal of individual trustees.** **YOUR CONSENT IS CRITICAL.**

If you have any questions or require any assistance in executing your consent, please contact D.F. King & Co., Inc. at (800) 714-3313 (toll-free) or (212) 269-5550 (call collect).

We thank you for your continuing support.

Keith Meister  
Corvex Management LP

Jeff T. Blau  
Related Fund Management, LLC

A copy of Related's and Corvex's consent solicitation materials can be obtained at [www.shareholdersforcommonwealth.com](http://www.shareholdersforcommonwealth.com) or by calling D.F. King & Co., Inc., our proxy solicitor, at 1-800-714-3313.

#### About Corvex Management LP

Corvex Management LP is an investment firm headquartered in New York, New York that engages in value based investing across the capital structure in situations with identifiable catalysts. Corvex was founded in March 2011 and follows an opportunistic approach to investing with a specific focus on equity investments, special situations and distressed securities largely in North America.

#### About Related Fund Management LLC

Related Fund Management, LLC is an affiliate of Related Companies, one of the most prominent privately-owned real estate firms in the United States. Formed 40 years ago, Related is a fully-integrated, highly diversified industry leader with experience in virtually every aspect of development, acquisitions, management, finance, marketing and sales. Related's existing portfolio of real estate assets, valued at over \$15 billion, is made up of best-in-class mixed-use, residential, retail, office and affordable properties. For more information about Related Companies please visit [www.related.com](http://www.related.com).

#### Additional Information Regarding the Consent Solicitation

In connection with their solicitation of written consents, Corvex and Related have filed a definitive written consent solicitation statement with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (the "SEC") to solicit written consents from shareholders of Commonwealth REIT. **Investors and security holders are urged to read the definitive written consent solicitation statement and other relevant documents when they become available, because they contain important information regarding the consent solicitation.** The definitive written consent solicitation statement and all other relevant documents are available, free of charge, on the SEC's website at [www.sec.gov](http://www.sec.gov).

The following persons are participants in connection with the written consent solicitation of Commonwealth's shareholders: Corvex Management LP, Keith Meister, Related Fund Management, LLC, Related Real Estate Recovery Fund GP-A, LLC, Related Real Estate Recovery Fund GP, L.P., Related Real Estate Recovery Fund, L.P., RRERF Acquisition, LLC, Jeff T. Blau, Richard O. Toole and David R. Johnson. Information regarding the participants in the consent solicitation and a description of their direct and indirect interests, by security holdings or otherwise, to the extent applicable, is available in the definitive written consent solicitation statement filed with the SEC on April 10, 2013 and Supplement No. 1 thereto filed on April 12, 2013.

# # #

For further information, contact:

D.F. King & Co., Inc.

Shareholders can call toll-free: (800) 714-3313

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The Case for Change Now at CWH  
Presentation to CWH Shareholders  
April 18, 2013

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Disclaimer

This presentation does not constitute either an offer to sell or a solicitation of an offer to buy any interest in any fund associated with the Company ( "Corvex" ) or Related Fund Management, LLC ( "Related" ). Any such offer would only be made at the time a qualified offer memorandum and related subscription documentation.

The information in this presentation is based on publicly available information about CommonWealth REIT (the "Company" ) and its subsidiaries. It contains forward-looking statements, estimates and projections prepared with respect to, among other things, general economic and market conditions, management, changes in the composition of the Company's Board of Trustees, actions of the Company and its subsidiaries or its subsidiaries to implement business strategies and plans and pursue business opportunities. Such forward-looking statements, estimates, and projections are based on assumptions concerning anticipated results that are inherently subject to significant uncertainties and contingencies and have the potential to differ materially from actual results.

illustrative purposes, including those risks and uncertainties detailed in the continuous disclosure and other filings of the Company available on the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission website ( EDGAR ) at [www.sec.gov/edgar](http://www.sec.gov/edgar). No representations, to the accuracy or completeness of such forward-looking statements, estimates or projections or with respect to any other material. Related may buy, sell, cover or otherwise change the form of their investment in the Company for any reason at any time, without assurances that they will take any of the actions described in this document. Corvex and Related disclaim any duty to provide analyses contained in this document, except as may be required by law. Shareholders and others should conduct their own independent analysis of the Company. Except where otherwise indicated, the information in this document speaks only as of the date set forth. Permission to quote third party reports in this presentation has been neither sought nor obtained.

#### Additional Information Regarding the Consent Solicitation

In connection with their solicitation of written consents, Corvex and Related have filed a definitive written consent solicitation statement with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the SEC ) to solicit written consents from shareholders of the Company. **Investors are encouraged** to read the definitive written consent solicitation statement and other relevant documents when they become available, because they contain important information regarding the consent solicitation.

The following persons are participants in connection with the written consent solicitation of the Company's shareholders: Corvex, Corvex Meister, Related Fund Management, LLC, Related Real Estate Recovery Fund GP-A, LLC, Related Real Estate Recovery Fund GP-B, LLC, Related Real Estate Recovery Fund, L.P., RRERF Acquisition, LLC, Jeff T. Blau, Richard O Toole and David R. Johnson. Information regarding the consent solicitation and a description of their direct and indirect interests, by security holdings or otherwise, to the extent applicable, is contained in the definitive written consent solicitation statement filed with the SEC on April 10, 2013 and Supplement No. 1 thereto filed on April 11, 2013. The definitive written consent solicitation statement and all other relevant documents are available, free of charge, on the SEC's website at [www.sec.gov](http://www.sec.gov).

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Executive Summary

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Executive Summary  
Immediate Change is Needed  
Outdated structure creates inherent conflicts of interest between shareholders and external manager Reit Management and Research, LLC ( RMR ), which is owned by Barry Portnoy and his son Adam, the two Managing Trustees of CWH

RMR receives fees based on gross historical cost basis of real estate, incentivizing growth through acquisitions regardless of returns to CWH shareholders

CWH paid out \$395 million in fees to RMR during 2007-2012 (nearly 30% of CWH's market

cap

as

of

2/25/13

(1)

),

while

CWH's

share

price

declined

68%

during

this

time

Poor corporate governance has led to continued self-dealing for benefit of RMR and the Portnoys in our view

Over \$2 billion of related party transactions in the last 5 years alone

ISS has taken notice and recommended voting against incumbent trustees last year

Given

entrenching

devices

in

CWH's

documents,

shareholders

must

act

now

to

remove

the

board

or

face

at

least

three

more

years

of

mismanagement

CWH's performance on key shareholder return and operating metrics has been poor in

absolute

and

relative  
terms  
over  
any  
relevant  
time  
period  
in  
our  
view  
We  
firmly  
believe  
Commonwealth  
REIT  
( CWH  
or  
the  
Company )

is  
in  
desperate need of a shareholder referendum given its flawed externally advised  
management structure, poor corporate governance, and track record of  
underperformance

(1)  
The day prior to Related and Corvex's first public filing.

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Executive Summary

Shareholder Referendum: Path

Path: action by written consent requiring 2/3 vote to remove entire board of trustees

We filed definitive consent solicitation materials with the SEC on April 10, 2013

We delivered to CWH formal shareholder demands to fix a record date to determine shareholders entitled to act by written consent on April 12, 2013

In  
light  
of  
the  
board's  
refusal  
to  
recognize  
our  
consent  
solicitation  
and  
fix  
a  
record  
date,  
it  
is  
our  
position  
that  
the  
record  
date  
will  
be  
the  
close  
of  
business  
on  
April  
22  
(i.e.  
the  
10  
th  
day after our request)

We and our lawyers believe CWH's recent bylaw amendments, which would effectively eliminate shareholder rights to remove trustees without cause, are invalid and a desperate attempt to disenfranchise shareholders (see pg. 39 and

41  
for  
details)

With a successful 2/3 vote, shareholders can remove current trustees, elect new trustees at a special meeting, terminate RMR's management agreement, and unlock significant value for all shareholders

Act  
now:  
the  
future  
of  
the  
Company  
is  
in  
your  
hands,  
its  
owners

We believe removing CWH's entire board of trustees immediately is in the best long-term interests of all shareholders, and the only near-term means for shareholders to effect change



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Executive Summary  
Shareholder Referendum: Value  
Value: \$35 per share potential NAV at 4/17/13 after removal of current trustees, and target stock price of \$44+ per share at 12/31/14 (see Appendix for details on valuation)

\$35  
represents  
upside  
potential

of  
55%  
and  
121%  
to  
current  
share  
price  
(1)  
and  
unaffected  
share  
price  
(2)

,  
respectively,  
after  
removal  
of  
board

In our view, NAV represents current fair market value (if current trustees are removed) based on bottom-up property-by-property valuation analysis led by Related, one of the most prominent privately-owned real estate firms in the U.S.

Key changes from previous valuation include CWH's massively dilutive equity offering (followed by dilutive debt tender at a premium), sale of CWH's minority stake in GOV, and additional market input

We believe CWH could trade at a stock price of \$44 or higher at 12/31/14 through internalization of management, operational turnaround, improved capital allocation, and multiple expansion

a  
straightforward  
path  
if  
shareholders  
act  
now  
to  
remove  
the  
board

In  
our  
view,  
potential  
downside

of  
-40%  
or  
greater  
to  
current  
price  
should  
existing  
trustees  
remain  
in  
place,  
due  
to  
market  
overhangs  
from  
external  
management,  
poor  
corporate  
governance,  
and  
likelihood  
of  
continued  
underperformance

(1)  
Based on a closing price of \$22.56 on April 17, 2013.

(2)  
Based  
on  
a  
closing  
price  
of  
\$15.85  
on  
February  
25,  
2013,  
the  
day  
prior  
to  
Related  
and  
Corvex s

first  
public  
filing.

We believe our path will unlock significant value for all shareholders, whereas

the  
status  
quo  
will  
lead  
to  
continued  
value  
destruction  
and  
self  
dealing  
for  
the  
benefit of the Portnoys

8  
Executive Summary  
Shareholder Referendum: Strategic Plan  
Strategic  
Plan:  
manage  
the  
Company  
in  
ways

that  
maximize  
long-term  
CWH  
shareholder  
value,  
not  
fees  
paid  
to  
RMR.  
Quite  
simply,  
CWH  
must  
adopt  
best  
practices

While corporate management will be replaced, we anticipate current property level employees will be hired to work at the new CWH

Amend  
existing  
Declaration  
of  
Trust  
and  
bylaws  
to  
conform  
to  
ISS  
and  
Glass  
Lewis  
best  
practices

no  
more  
shareholder  
disenfranchisement

Cease  
all  
acquisition  
activity  
until  
CWH's  
stock

price  
exceeds  
its  
NAV

no  
more  
dilutive  
equity  
offerings  
or  
ignoring  
the  
views  
of  
shareholders

Use  
excess  
cash  
flow  
to  
buy  
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CWH  
stock  
until  
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Company's  
stock  
price  
exceeds  
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NAV

no  
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high,  
sell  
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capital  
allocation

Cease  
all  
related  
party  
transactions

no  
more  
self-dealing  
for  
benefit  
of  
the  
Portnoys  
Jim  
Lozier,  
former  
CEO  
and  
co-founder  
of  
the  
Archon  
Group  
L.P.,  
and  
CBRE,  
the  
world's  
largest  
commercial  
real  
estate  
services  
firm,  
are  
in  
discussions  
with  
us  
to  
be  
available  
to  
provide  
interim  
management,  
property  
management  
services,  
and  
leasing  
services  
to  
the  
CWH



portfolio  
as  
necessary  
While  
a  
new  
board  
selected  
by  
all  
shareholders  
will  
ultimately  
determine  
the  
details  
of  
CWH s  
new  
strategic  
plan,  
we  
propose  
the  
following  
key  
elements  
as  
a  
starting  
point  
for  
the  
Company s  
new  
direction

Internalize management, adopt a market cost structure, and align  
management  
compensation with shareholder returns  
no more skewed incentives

9

Executive Summary

Structural Change is Much Needed

(1)

Note: Citi was a lead underwriter in CWH's recent massively dilutive equity offering completed on February 27, 2013. Even CWH's underwriter has taken pains to point out the Company's flawed structure and history of value destruction

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Executive Summary

Track Record of Underperformance

CWH has in our view performed poorly in absolute terms and underperformed its peers

(1)

on almost any metric over any relevant time period

-17%, -45%, -43%, -45%, and -53% CWH stock price return over the last 1 year, 2 years, 3 years,

5

years,  
and  
10  
years,  
respectively

(2)  
Recent  
valuation  
nearly  
40%  
below  
peers  
on  
unlevered  
cap  
rate  
basis

(3)  
53% and 41% discount to peers on a price / forward FFO multiple basis for last year and 3  
years, respectively  
-23% cash available for distribution per share (CAD / share) growth since 2010, the worst  
performance of its peers

\$2.7  
billion  
of  
net  
acquisitions  
and  
capex  
since  
2007  
(over  
2x  
CWH's  
recent  
market  
cap

(3)  
,  
while CWH book value per share is essentially flat

In  
our  
view,  
there  
is  
absolutely  
no  
way  
to  
slice

and  
dice  
the  
data  
in  
favor  
of  
the  
Portnoys

their  
performance  
has  
been  
horrible

(1)  
Select peers include Piedmont Office Realty (PDM), Highwoods Properties (HIW), Mack-Cali Realty (CLI), Brandywine Real

(2)  
Returns  
data  
calculated  
through  
February  
25,  
2013,  
the  
day  
prior  
to  
Related  
and  
Corvex s  
first  
public  
filing.

(3)  
Based  
on  
a  
closing  
price  
of  
\$15.85  
on  
February  
25,  
2013,  
the  
day  
prior

to  
Corvex  
and  
Related s  
first  
public  
filing.

11  
Executive Summary  
Flawed RMR Structure and Poor Corporate Governance  
ISS  
recommended  
voting  
against  
incumbent  
trustees  
last

year  
(per  
ISS  
Proxy  
Advisory  
Services  
report,  
April  
25,  
2012)  
Proposal  
to  
Elect  
Director  
William  
A.  
Lamkin

ISS  
RECOMMENDATION:  
AGAINST  
Proposal  
to  
Elect  
Director  
Adam  
D.  
Portnoy

ISS  
RECOMMENDATION:  
AGAINST  
ISS Governance Risk Indicators:

Shareholder Rights HIGH CONCERN

The board is classified

The company has a poison pill in effect

The company's poison pill includes a dead-hand, slow-hand, or similar provision

The company's poison pill has not been approved by shareholders

Board Structure MEDIUM CONCERN

40% of the directors are family members of executives or majority shareholders

The

company

has

a

poison

pill

that

contains



a  
dead-hand,  
slow-hand,  
or  
similar  
feature.  
Such  
features  
are  
uncommon  
and  
are  
unjustifiable  
from  
a  
governance  
standpoint.  
Not  
only  
do  
dead-hand  
poison  
pills  
and  
their  
variants  
exclude  
shareholders  
from  
the  
corporate  
governance  
process,  
but  
they  
also  
disenfranchise  
future  
directors

12

## Executive Summary

### Gigantic Conflicts of Interest

The externally managed REIT structure creates conflicts of interest that are so severe, we don't believe we can quantify the share price discount an investor should require to buy any of these companies. As a result, we have long deemed the Portnoy REITs to be uninvestable.

For most externally advised REITs, the fee paid to the advisor is predicated on the company's size

not on its success (or lack thereof). Therein lies the conflict of interest. The advisor carries a strong incentive to constantly sell common stock in order to raise funds for acquisitions. The price at which the equity is raised matters little to the advisor making the REIT bigger and increasing the advisory fee is a primary objective.

The Portnoy REITs  
What It Means to be Uninvestable ,  
Green Street Advisors,  
March 1, 2013

13  
Executive Summary  
Questions All CWH Shareholders Should be Asking  
Have  
current  
trustees  
created  
value  
for  
CWH

shareholders?

Is it possible for existing trustees to fairly represent shareholders given their conflicts of interest?

Why have RMR's fees gone up 30% since 2007 while CWH's stock has declined 68%?

Why are the Portnoy REITs some of the last remaining externally managed equity REITs in the public markets?

Will

CWH

ever

trade

at

a

peer

valuation

with

RMR

as

its

external

manager?

How

much

of

the

Portnoy

fortune

has

been

extracted

from

the

savings

of

retail

investors?

Why does CWH lag peers on nearly every relevant operational metric?

Why did CWH seek to sell equity at a 48% discount to book value to repay debt trading above par with no maturities or liquidity needs?

Why did CWH sell its \$240 million minority stake in GOV only after massively diluting shareholders by issuing \$650 million in new CWH equity at \$19.00?

How can existing trustees defend selling equity at \$19.00, a massive discount, at the same time they ignored an offer at \$27.00, a significant premium?

How

can

CWH

call

its

hand-picked

trustees

independent?

14  
Executive Summary  
Questions All CWH Shareholders Should be Asking (cont d)  
Why  
haven't  
CWH's  
independent  
trustees  
formed  
an

independent  
committee

and

hired

independent advisors?

How have CWH shareholders been compensated for the multiple new RMR platforms launched with CWH's assets?

Does

CWH

even

have

a

strategy,

or

is

it

simply

recycling

capital

to

create

the

appearance

of doing

something?

Why does CWH refuse to hold Q&A on its conference calls and roadshows?

Why

are

the

Portnoys

trying

to

change

Maryland

law

rather

than

face

a

shareholder

vote?

Why haven't current trustees prepared a detailed presentation of their own

demonstrating how much

value they have created for CWH shareholders?

Why isn't anyone in the REIT industry speaking up to defend the Portnoys?

How much CWH shareholder money have existing trustees already wasted in the last seven weeks

trying to further entrench themselves?

How

much

more

damage  
will  
be  
inflicted  
on  
CWH  
shareholders  
in  
the  
next  
3  
years  
if  
current  
trustees  
are  
not  
removed  
immediately?



15  
History of Underperformance

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History of Underperformance

CWH has in our view performed poorly in absolute terms and underperformed its peers on almost any metric over any relevant time period

Stock price performance and total shareholder return

Valuation

Cost structure

Acquisitions and return on investment

NOI, EBITDA, CAD, and FFO / share growth

Corporate governance

In  
our  
view,  
there  
is  
absolutely  
no  
way  
to  
slice  
and  
dice  
the  
data  
in  
favor  
of  
the  
Portnoys

their  
performance  
has  
been  
horrible

(\$ in millions, except per share values and TEV / sq. ft.)

Enterprise

Implied

G&A /

Current

Equity

value

nominal

TEV /

equity

Net debt /  
P / FFO  
TEV / EBITDA  
Div  
Ticker  
Company  
price  
mkt cap  
(TEV)  
cap rate  
Sq. Ft.  
mkt cap  
TEV  
2013E  
2014E  
2013E  
2014E  
yield  
CWH  
CommonWealth REIT  
\$15.85  
\$1,338  
\$4,914  
11.1%  
\$89  
3.9%  
76%  
5.4x  
5.5x  
12.0x  
12.3x  
6.3%  
HIW  
Highwoods Properties Inc.  
\$35.35  
\$2,983  
\$4,999  
6.6%  
\$144  
1.3%  
40%  
13.1x  
12.7x  
15.6x  
14.8x  
4.8%  
BDN  
Brandywine Realty Trust  
\$12.96  
\$1,885

\$4,689  
7.1%  
\$176  
1.3%  
58%  
9.0x  
8.6x  
14.1x  
13.8x  
4.6%  
CLI  
Mack-Cali Realty Corp.  
\$27.15  
\$2,715  
\$4,983  
8.2%  
\$158  
1.8%  
44%  
10.6x  
10.5x  
13.4x  
13.3x  
6.6%  
PDM  
Piedmont Office Realty Trust Inc.  
\$19.66  
\$3,294  
\$4,699  
6.9%  
\$229  
0.6%  
30%  
14.0x  
13.5x  
15.8x  
15.1x  
4.1%  
PKY  
Parkway Properties Inc.  
\$16.39  
\$920  
\$2,096  
6.0%  
\$177  
1.8%  
37%  
13.3x  
12.4x  
14.2x

13.7x  
2.7%  
High  
\$3,294  
\$4,999  
8.2%  
\$229  
1.8%  
58%  
14.0x  
13.5x  
15.8x  
15.1x  
6.6%  
Mean  
2,359  
4,293  
7.0%  
177  
1.4%  
42%  
12.0x  
11.5x  
14.6x  
14.1x  
4.6%  
Median  
2,715  
4,699  
6.9%  
176  
1.3%  
40%  
13.1x  
12.4x  
14.2x  
13.8x  
4.6%  
Low  
920  
2,096  
6.0%  
144  
0.6%  
30%  
9.0x  
8.6x  
13.4x  
13.3x  
2.7%

17

History of Underperformance

Summary Public Comparables

CWH trades at a significant discount to its peers on all key measures

(1)

Note: Share price and estimates updated as of 2/25/2013, the day before Related and Corvex's 13D filing

Financial information as of Q4 2012. Implied nominal cap rate is calculated as GAAP LTM NOI / TEV.

(1) CWH implied cap rate based on CWH standalone TEV of \$4,914 million and Related and Corvex estimates of comparable

Source: Company filings and FactSet



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History of Underperformance

Total Returns

1 year

HIW: 15.5%

PDM: 15.3%

CWH: (9.4%)

PKY: 65.5%

CLI: 1.5%

BDN: 25.2%

RMZ: 10.6%

Note: Total returns include dividends

Source: SNL

1 year

3 year

PKY

65.5%

6.9%

BDN

25.2%

35.8%

HIW

15.5%

42.1%

PDM

15.3%

39.1%

CLI

1.5%

(2.7%)

Average

24.6%

24.2%

RMZ

10.6%

52.5%

CWH

(9.4%)

(26.6%)

CWH

Avg.

34.0%

50.8%

CWH has underperformed its peers over the last year

CWH's peer with the closest total return performance is CLI, which has consistently outperformed CWH notwithstanding having 80% of its office markets either struggling or in secular decline

19

History of Underperformance

Total Returns

3 years

CWH has underperformed its peers over the last 3 years

HIW: 42.1%

PDM: 39.1%

CWH: (26.6%)

PKY: 6.9%

CLI: (2.7%)

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BDN: 35.8%

RMZ: 52.5%

Note: Total returns include dividends

Source: SNL

1 year

3 year

PKY

65.5%

6.9%

BDN

25.2%

35.8%

HIW

15.5%

42.1%

PDM

15.3%

39.1%

CLI

1.5%

(2.7%)

Average

24.6%

24.2%

RMZ

10.6%

52.5%

CWH

(9.4%)

(26.6%)

CWH

Avg.

34.0%

50.8%

20

History of Underperformance

Share Price Performance

1 year

CWH has underperformed its peers over the last year

HIW: 9.8%

PDM: 10.1%

CWH: (16.9%)

PKY: 60.2%

CLI: 5.0%

BDN: 19.1%

Source: Factset

1 year

3 year

PKY

60.2%

(0.7%)

BDN

19.1%

15.4%

HIW

9.8%

21.4%

PDM

10.1%

16.1%

CLI

(5.0%)

(18.9%)

Average

18.8%

6.6%

CWH

(16.9%)

(42.9%)

CWH

Avg.

35.7%

49.5%

21  
History of Underperformance  
Share  
Price  
Performance

3  
years  
CWH has underperformed its peers over the last three years  
HIW: 21.4%

PDM: 15.4%  
CWH: (42.9%)  
PKY: (0.7%)  
CLI: (18.9%)  
BDN: 16.1%  
Source: Factset  
1 year  
3 year  
PKY  
60.2%  
(0.7%)  
BDN  
19.1%  
15.4%  
HIW  
9.8%  
21.4%  
PDM  
10.1%  
16.1%  
CLI  
(5.0%)  
(18.9%)  
Average  
18.8%  
6.6%  
CWH  
(16.9%)  
(42.9%)  
CWH  
Avg.  
35.7%  
49.5%



22

History of Underperformance

FFO Multiples

CWH traded at the lowest price to FFO multiple of its peers prior to our 13D filing

PDM: 14.0x

CWH: 5.4x

HIW: 13.1x

CLI: 10.6x

BDN: 9.0x

Source: Factset

PKY: 13.3x

Average

1 year

3 year

PKY

9.9x

7.9x

BDN

8.9x

8.6x

HIW

12.3x

12.8x

PDM

12.6x

12.3x

CLI

10.4x

11.1x

Average

10.8x

10.5x

CWH

5.0x

6.2x

CWH

Avg.

(53.4%)

(40.7%)

23

History of Underperformance

Operating Performance

Value

accruing to

RMR, not

shareholders

Poor performance on key financial metrics, while fees paid to RMR continue to

grow

(1)

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Share price performance assumes stock is held since January 1st of the specified year through February 25th, 2013.

Source: Company filings and SNL

(\$ in millions)

For the Fiscal Year Ending December 31,

2010

2011

2012

Share

Price

Performance

(if

held

since)

(1)

(38.2%)

(39.0%)

(6.9%)

SF Owned per Share (% growth)

(15.9%)

(5.2%)

(0.6%)

NOI per Share (% growth)

(19.1%)

(4.2%)

16.1%

EBITDA per Share (% growth)

(22.1%)

(4.7%)

(27.2%)

FFO per Share (% growth)

(13.8%)

(9.9%)

0.0%

CAD per Share (% growth)

(23.7%)

(27.7%)

(17.3%)

Fees Paid to RMR

\$62.2

\$69.5

\$77.3

% growth

3.4%

11.7%

11.2%

24

History of Underperformance

Same Store Underperformance

CWH trails its core office REIT peers by 225 bps and 265 bps on same store rental growth and NOI growth, respectively

Despite its greater scale, CWH's cost structure results in the lowest same store NOI margins of its peers

CWH's total rental and NOI growth is dependent upon its outsized acquisition activity

CWH underperforms its peers on a same store basis

Note: Analysis excludes PDM, which does not disclose same store rent

(1)

(2)

(3)

Source: Company filings

9

months

ended

9/30/2012

rent

growth

(1)

9

months

ended

9/30/2012

NOI

growth

(1)

9

months

ended

9/30/2012

NOI

margin

(1)

CommonWealth excluded 94 underperforming properties as discontinued properties in its same store financials ending 12/31/2012 as a more representative reflection of company performance

Average does not include CWH

Unlike CWH, 80% of CLI's markets are either struggling or in secular decline

(3.0%)

(2.0%)

(1.0%)

0.0%

1.0%

2.0%

3.0%

4.0%

2.8%

2.2%

0.8%

(1.1%)

(2.0%)

PKY

HIW

BDN

CWH

CLI

6.5%

3.3%

2.7%

0.2%  
(1.1%)  
(2.0%)  
(1.0%)  
0.0%  
1.0%  
2.0%  
3.0%  
4.0%  
5.0%  
6.0%  
7.0%  
PKY  
HIW  
BDN  
CWH  
CLI  
70.5%  
67.7%  
61.0%  
59.8%  
57.7%  
50.0%  
55.0%  
60.0%  
65.0%  
70.0%  
75.0%  
BDN  
HIW  
CLI  
PKY  
CWH  
Avg  
(2)  
: 1.2%  
Avg  
(2)  
: 2.8%  
Avg  
(2)  
: 64.7%  
(3)  
(3)

25

History of Underperformance

Same Store Underperformance (cont d)

CWH has consistently underperformed its peers on a same store basis historically

Note: Analysis excludes PDM, which does not disclose same store rent

(1)

Average does not include CWH

Source: Company filings

2010 rent growth

2010 NOI growth



2010 NOI margin  
2011 rent growth  
2011 NOI growth  
2011 NOI margin

0.3%  
(2.8%)  
(2.5%)  
(3.5%)  
(5.2%)  
(6.0%)  
(5.0%)  
(4.0%)  
(3.0%)  
(2.0%)  
(1.0%)

0.0%

1.0%

HIW

BDN

CLI

CWH

PKY

Avg

(1)

:

(2.5%)  
(0.9%)  
(3.3%)  
(3.7%)  
(6.2%)  
(8.5%)  
(9.0%)  
(8.0%)  
(7.0%)  
(6.0%)  
(5.0%)  
(4.0%)  
(3.0%)  
(2.0%)  
(1.0%)

0.0%

HIW

CLI

BDN

PKY

CWH

Avg

(1)

:

(3.5%)

68.4%  
66.6%  
60.2%  
55.7%  
54.3%  
50.0%  
55.0%  
60.0%  
65.0%  
70.0%  
BDN  
HIW  
CLI  
PKY  
CWH  
Avg  
(1)  
:  
62.7%  
(1.6%)  
(2.6%)  
(3.0%)  
(3.4%)  
(3.7%)  
(4.0%)  
(3.5%)  
(3.0%)  
(2.5%)  
(2.0%)  
(1.5%)  
(1.0%)  
(0.5%)  
0.0%  
CWH  
BDN  
HIW  
CLI  
PKY  
Avg  
(1)  
:  
(3.2%)  
0.0%  
(0.9%)  
(3.1%)  
(4.3%)  
(6.4%)  
(7.0%)  
(6.0%)  
(5.0%)

(4.0%)  
(3.0%)  
(2.0%)  
(1.0%)  
0.0%  
1.0%  
HIW  
PKY  
BDN  
CWH  
CLI  
Avg  
(1)  
:  
(2.6%)  
69.5%  
67.3%  
60.2%  
55.9%  
53.6%  
50.0%  
55.0%  
60.0%  
65.0%  
70.0%  
75.0%  
BDN  
HIW  
CLI  
CWH  
PKY  
Avg  
(1)  
:  
62.7%

26

History of Underperformance

Acquisition Activity

CWH has grown primarily through asset acquisitions, which we believe benefit RMR and not shareholders

(1)

Market cap as of 12/31/12. Metric shown includes SIR.

(2)

Includes net sale proceeds from consolidated joint venture

(3)

Weighted by market cap

Source: Company filings and Factset

Net  
acquisitions

/  
CapEx

as  
%

of  
Recent  
Market  
Cap

(1)  
2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

Cumulative

Parkway Properties Inc. (PKY)

6.4%

26.2%

2.2%

8.7%

42.4%

75.2%

161.1%

Highwoods Properties Inc. (HIW)

5.3%

5.2%

2.3%

3.4%

6.1%

9.0%

31.3%

Mack-Cali Realty Corp. (CLI)

15.0%

3.6%

0.8%

3.6%

3.6%

3.3%

29.9%

Piedmont

Office

Realty

Trust

Inc.

(PDM)

(2)

1.5%

4.1%

1.2%

2.1%

(2.5%)

0.5%

6.9%

Brandywine Realty Trust (BDN)

(6.6%)

(12.8%)

6.0%

10.4%

0.9%

0.3%

(1.8%)

Average

(3)

4.7%

3.1%

2.2%

4.6%

4.9%

8.7%

28.2%

CWH

31.0%

6.1%

33.5%

27.3%

44.6%

55.6%

198.1%

CWH share price

\$30.92

\$13.48

\$25.88

\$25.76

\$16.64

\$15.84

CWH price / FFO multiple

6.8x

3.1x

6.0x

6.9x

4.9x

4.7x

CWH has spent \$2.7 billion on acquisitions since 2007 as the stock has underperformed

Its peers acquired at approximately one-seventh of CWH's rate over the same period

PKY

has  
also  
been  
acquisitive,  
but  
is  
internally  
managed  
and  
has  
made  
accretive  
capital  
allocation  
decisions, leading to 42% stock price appreciation from 2011 to 2012

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History of Underperformance

Management and Board Ownership

CWH trustees and senior management hold a smaller stake than those of peers

CWH's insiders currently hold a 0.3% stake in the company

The ownership level is approximately one-tenth the insider ownership of the comp set

We believe management is not aligned with shareholders

Peer Director and Executive Officer Ownership

(1)

Average does not include CWH



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Source: Company filings, CWH holdings per proxy filed 2/25/13

CWH Insider Holdings

Position

% of S/O

Directors and Executive Officers:

1

Barry M. Portnoy

233,086

0.20%

2

Adam D. Portnoy

38,599

0.03%

3

John C. Popeo

33,500

0.03%

4

David M. Lepore

29,250

0.02%

5

Frederick N. Zeytoonjian

10,967

0.01%

6

William A. Lamkin

8,812

0.01%

7

Joseph L. Morea

2,000

0.00%

356,214

0.30%

Total CWH Director and Executive

Officer Ownership

0.0%

1.0%

2.0%

3.0%

4.0%

5.0%

6.0%

7.0%

8.0%

6.8%

3.0%

3.0%

2.8%

0.5%

0.3%

CLI

HIW

PKY

BDN

PDM

CWH

Avg. (1): 3.2%

28

#### History of Underperformance

##### Externally Managed Equity REITs

Out of approximately 90 equity REITs with greater than \$1 billion market cap and greater than 1 year in the public markets, only six are externally managed today

The externally managed REITs have consistently underperformed their internally managed peers

SNH peers include HCP, VTR, HCN, ARE, BMR, OHI, HTA, HR, NHI, MPW, LTC, SBRA, and UHT

HPT peers include HST, LHO, DRH, RHP, RLJ, SHO, PEB, BEE, HT, AHT, FCH, CHSP, INN, CLDT, MDH, and SPPR

CWH and GOV peers include PKY, PDM, BDN, CLI, and HIW

As of March 12, 2013

Source: SNL

: CWH

Avg.

Company (ticker)

Property type

External corporate

adviser

Market cap

(\$M)

Premium/

discount to NAV

(%)

3-year total

return (%)

Senior Housing Properties Trust (SNH)

Health care

RMR

4,742.7

(33.6)

(25.0)

Hospitality Properties Trust (HPT)

Hotel

RMR

3,277.6

1.2

(0.7)

CommonWealth REIT (CWH)

Office

RMR

2,573.1

(40.8)

(32.5)

Government Properties Income Trust (GOV)

Office

RMR

1,361.7

2.7

0.7

Select Income REIT (SIR)

Diversified

RMR

1,028.8

NA

NA

Average

2,596.8

(17.6)

(14.4)

RMR manages five of those six REITs

The sixth is Alexander's (ALX), which is managed by Vornado; however Vornado, also holds a

32% stake in the company

29

History of Underperformance

No Management Credibility

Management appears to lack an understanding of their own finances given a 50% cut in the dividend one quarter after dismissing the question

CWH appears to have now discontinued Q&A on all of its conference calls

Yeah.

I'm

glad

you

asked  
that,  
John,  
because  
it's  
something  
that  
a  
lot  
of  
investors  
have  
asked  
us  
about,  
and  
it's  
the  
security  
of  
the  
dividend.  
Right  
now,  
we  
acknowledge  
that  
it  
certainly  
appears  
that  
the  
market  
is  
expecting  
a  
dividend  
cut.  
We  
disclosed  
our  
CAD  
payout  
ratio  
as  
a  
104%.  
That  
is  
above

100%,  
it's  
not  
much  
above  
100%.  
We  
think  
we  
can  
maintain  
this  
dividend  
for  
the  
foreseeable  
future.  
If  
the  
payout  
ratio  
were  
to  
balloon  
up,  
well  
above  
104%,  
well  
above  
100%,  
and  
be  
there  
for  
quite  
some  
time,  
I  
think  
we'd  
have  
to  
seriously  
consider  
reducing  
the  
dividend.  
But  
right



now,  
there's  
no  
intention  
from  
management  
or  
the  
Board,  
to  
do  
anything  
with  
the  
dividend.  
Now  
that  
might  
change  
as  
circumstances  
change.  
But  
today,  
we  
have  
no  
intention  
of  
changing  
the  
dividend.  
And  
I  
have  
to  
tell  
you,  
it  
is  
  
at  
times  
it  
is  
perplexing  
to  
us,  
because  
we

look  
at  
our  
numbers  
and  
say  
we  
can  
afford  
the  
dividend,  
and  
the  
dividend  
doesn't  
look  
like  
it  
should  
be  
at  
risk.  
Yet  
the  
stock  
price  
seems  
to  
indicate  
that  
everybody  
else  
doesn't  
see  
that.  
They  
think  
that  
we're  
going  
to  
  
that  
there  
should  
be  
a  
dividend  
cut.  
Maybe

they  
are  
anticipating  
something  
years  
from  
now,  
or  
a  
long  
time  
from  
now.  
But  
I  
don't

it  
is

sometimes  
it's  
as  
perplexing  
to  
us  
as  
to  
maybe  
you,  
John,  
but  
that's  
our  
thoughts  
on  
it.

And  
then  
the  
last  
question,  
the  
obvious  
question,  
as  
you  
are  
bouncing  
around

\$18,  
\$19  
a  
share,  
high  
10s  
on  
the  
dividend,  
clearly  
when  
you're  
at  
that  
level,  
people  
are  
either  
anticipating  
a  
diminution  
or  
a  
decline  
in  
share  
value  
and/or  
a  
dividend  
adjustment.  
And  
it  
seems  
to  
me  
that  
if  
the  
stocks  
price  
can't  
get  
back  
up  
into  
the  
low  
to  
mid

20's,  
a  
dividend  
cut  
would  
be  
the  
prudent  
thing  
to  
do.  
In  
fact,  
if  
you  
cut  
the  
dividend  
down  
to  
\$1.20  
you'd  
still  
have  
one  
of  
the  
highest  
dividends  
in  
the  
office  
industrial  
REIT  
space.  
So  
what's  
your  
thought  
process  
on  
all  
that?

Stifel Nicolaus: Q1 2012 Earnings Call, May 3, 2012  
Adam Portnoy: Q1 2012 Earnings Call, May 3, 2012

30  
Flawed RMR Structure and  
Poor Corporate Governance

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Flawed RMR Structure and Poor Corporate Governance

RMR Fees vs. CWH Shareholder Returns

Fees paid to RMR continue to grow, while CWH shareholder value continues to decline

RMR extracted nearly 30% of CWH's market cap during 2007-2012, as CWH stock continued to plummet

'07-'12

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

Total

Fees Paid Out to RMR

\$59.7

\$63.2

\$62.6

\$62.2

\$69.5

\$77.3

\$394.6

RMR Fees % Growth

--

5.9%

(1.0%)

(0.5%)

11.7%

11.2%

29.5%

RMR

Fees

as

%

of:

CWH Market Cap

4.5%

4.8%

4.7%

4.7%

5.2%

5.8%

29.7%

CWH Market Cap, Cumulative

4.5%

9.3%

14.0%

18.6%

23.9%

29.7%

29.7%

CWH Cumulative Stock Price Return

(37.4%)

(74.7%)

(46.0%)

(48.4%)

(66.3%)

(67.9%)

(67.9%)



(1)

Market cap of \$1.3 billion based on a closing price of \$15.85 on February 25, 2013, the day prior to Related and Corvex's first

(2)

RMR fees paid per CWH public filings.

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Flawed RMR Structure and Poor Corporate Governance

Flawed RMR Structure

We believe CWH's externally managed structure skews incentives, reduces cash flow through excessive fees, destroys investor confidence, and impairs valuation multiple (off already depressed earnings)

RMR receives fees based on gross historical cost basis, incentivizing growth through acquisitions regardless of returns to CWH shareholders or strategic rationale

\$2.7 billion of net acquisitions and capex since 2007 (over 2x CWH's recent market

cap  
(1)  
, while CWH book value per share essentially flat  
Trustees  
own  
less  
than  
1%  
of  
CWH  
stock,  
but  
certain  
trustees  
own  
100%  
of  
RMR,  
skewing  
their incentives in favor of the external manager

RMR, a private company, is owned by Barry Portnoy and his son Adam Portnoy

All executive officers of CWH are also officers of RMR

Barry Portnoy's son-in-law is also an officer of RMR

Given  
these  
inherent  
and  
widely  
recognized  
problems,  
CWH  
and  
the  
other  
Portnoy  
REITs  
are  
some of the last remaining publicly traded equity REITs today

(1)

Market cap of \$1.3 billion based on a closing price of \$15.85 on February 25, 2013, the day prior to Related and Corvex's first

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Flawed RMR Structure and Poor Corporate Governance

External Manager RMR Causes Concern

We recommend investors avoid the shares of CWH at this time due to the uncertainty generated by the spinoff of SIR and the continuous decline in per share values. SIR is the second spinoff since 2009 and a recent one, GOV, did not seem to benefit the share holders. It appears that SIR, which carried little debt and all of the highest margin properties from CWH to its own portfolio, may become an acquisition vehicle. The manager

seems  
to  
be  
making  
decisions  
which  
are  
beneficial  
to  
the  
management  
company and detrimental to the shareholders. The management contract awards  
compensation for growing the portfolio but not as much for improving share value.  
The  
portfolio  
is  
in  
good  
shape  
and  
could  
be  
worth  
more  
to  
an  
acquirer  
An  
acquirer  
could also reduce the operating costs by about \$50 million annually by replacing  
RMR.

External Manager RMR Causes Concern At CommonWealth REIT,  
Seeking Alpha,  
August 27, 2012

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Flawed RMR Structure and Poor Corporate Governance

Poor Corporate Governance

In our view trustees have crossed the limits of legally enforceable corporate governance time and time again in order to disenfranchise CWH shareholders, insulate management, and maximize control

and  
financial  
benefits  
for  
RMR  
One of the Portnoys  
latest legal maneuvers was a secret, failed attempt (likely using CWH  
funds)  
to  
insert  
an  
11  
th  
hour  
amendment  
into  
a  
Maryland  
House  
Bill  
that  
would  
have  
allowed  
CWH to unilaterally eliminate shareholders right to remove trustees without cause

Trustees would rather intervene in the Maryland legislative process and change the law  
than face their own shareholders

Over \$2 billion of related party transactions in last 5 years

CWH assets have been repeatedly used to seed new platforms for RMR, creating new  
income streams for RMR without, in our view, due compensation for CWH shareholders,  
and worsening the cash flow profile of CWH

We  
believe  
3  
so-called  
independent  
trustees  
are  
conflicted  
by  
any  
common  
sense definition

2  
of  
CWH s  
independent

trustees  
serve  
on boards of other RMR-managed entities

3  
rd  
independent  
trustee  
was  
former  
RBC  
banker  
in  
capital  
markets  
division (retired in  
2012), which regularly receives lucrative business from CWH (including recent dilutive  
equity offering) and RMR's other entities  
Other issues include a classified board, poison pill, and slow hand provision  
ISS  
has  
taken  
notice  
and  
recommended  
voting  
against  
incumbent  
trustees  
last  
year



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Flawed RMR Structure and Poor Corporate Governance

Scorched Earth Policies Require Action Now

These value destructive actions include:

A massively dilutive equity offering done 48% below book value to repay debt trading above par

Two separate bylaw amendments that in our view are invalid and seek to disenfranchise shareholders by effectively eliminating their ability to act by written consent to remove

trustees without cause

A failed attempt to secretly change Maryland law to make it impossible for shareholders to remove trustees without cause

A contemplated sale of CWH's 56% controlling interest in SIR at a potential discount to the market price rather than a control premium (which would also allow RMR to continue extracting fees from SIR)

If any shareholders had doubts as to where the trustees' allegiances lie, these actions have made clear it is with the Portnoys and not shareholders. Since our first call for change seven weeks ago, the Portnoys and their hand-picked trustees have used Company funds in a self-serving campaign aimed at, in our view, advancing their own financial interests and entrenchment. If shareholders don't act now to remove the entire board, we will be subject to at least three more years of mismanagement, the minimum time needed to replace a simple majority of CWH's super-charged staggered Board. If less than the entire board is removed, vacancies will be filled by the remaining

trustees and no change will be effected

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Flawed RMR Structure and Poor Corporate Governance

Conflicted Board of Trustees

Significant overlap of board members across RMR entities, including so-called independent

trustees

In

our

view

Portnoys

and  
independent  
trustees  
conflicted  
by  
any  
common  
sense  
definition

2  
of  
3  
independent  
trustees  
serve  
on  
other  
Portnoy  
boards

3  
independent  
trustee  
just  
retired  
from  
RBC  
capital  
markets  
division  
in  
2012,

a  
division  
which regularly receives lucrative business from CWH (including the recent dilutive equity offering) and RMR's other entities  
Same Job, Different Company?

Travel Centers  
Five Star  
RMR Real Estate  
Name  
Title  
CWH  
HPT  
SNH  
GOV  
SIR  
of America  
Senior Living  
Income Fund  
Senior

Management:

Adam D. Portnoy  
President & Managing Trustee

Vern D. Larkin  
Director of Internal Audit

Jennifer B. Clark  
Secretary

Board  
of

Directors:

Adam D. Portnoy  
President & Managing Trustee

Barry D. Portnoy  
Managing Trustee

William A. Lamkin  
Partner at Ackrell Capital

Frederick N. Zeytoonjian  
Founder & CEO of Turf Products

Joseph Morea  
Retired RBC Banker

rd

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Flawed RMR Structure and Poor Corporate Governance

Dilutive Equity Offering

Despite protests from some of its largest shareholders, a bona fide offer for \$27.00 per share, and in our view no need to issue equity, on March 5, 2013 CWH sold 34.5 million shares at \$19.00

Transaction increased CWH's share count by 41% and diluted CWH's NAV by over \$6 per share

Why did CWH sell its \$240 million minority stake in GOV only after issuing new CWH shares

at a 48% discount to book value?

Perhaps recognizing its actions were indefensible, trustees insulated themselves from questioning and ignored shareholder demands to stop offering

Canceled investor lunch and did not hold Q&A on roadshow call  
CWH's use of proceeds for the equity offering, at a massive discount, was to repay debt trading at prices ranging from 102% to 111% of par

Remarkably, CWH did not have any upcoming maturities or liquidity issues associated with this debt or any debt

We believe recently completed equity offering serves as clear example of poor management, skewed incentives, and terrible capital allocation

However,  
equity  
offering  
increases  
Company's  
equity  
base,  
creating  
additional  
capacity  
to  
do  
acquisitions  
and  
thereby  
pay  
more  
management  
fees  
to  
RMR



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Flawed RMR Structure and Poor Corporate Governance

Acting in the best interest of RMR rather than as a fiduciary

[Related and Corvex] are spending their own dollars, while CWH is spending

shareholder

money

to

prevent

RMR

from

being  
terminated

-

an  
outcome

we  
think

virtually all shareholders favor. Ironic.

RMR, with \$77mm of high-margin annual revenue on the line, has too much to lose and is directing the CWH board to fight to the finish (using shareholder dollars to do so).

The CWH board, controlled by external manager RMR, is in the unique position of acting in the best interest of RMR rather than as a fiduciary to the CWH Shareholders.

If RMR prevails, we believe the end result is the instantaneous resumption of CWH shares trading at a significant discount to NAV - we believe a \$15/sh price...

Stifel Nicolaus, March 7, 2013

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Flawed RMR Structure and Poor Corporate Governance

March 1 Bylaw Amendment

On Friday, March 1, 2013, CWH announced its bylaws had been amended to clarify that a shareholder seeking to take action to remove one or more Trustees must comply with the same bylaw requirements as a shareholder making a nomination of an individual for election to the Board.

(3% / 3 year requirement)

Clarification

is actually an attempt to re-craft bylaws in order to effectively eliminate a shareholder right (action by written consent to remove trustees) granted in CWH s Declaration of Trust since 1986

The Declaration of Trust can only be changed through a shareholder vote, explaining why trustees are attempting to use the bylaws in this backdoor manner  
The Declaration of Trust supersedes the bylaws, and bylaws cannot be used to remove a right granted in the Declaration of Trust

Amateurish word games suggest to us that trustees are terrified of facing their own shareholders, and have looked to throw up any obstacle or delay tactic they can

We are litigating this matter in Maryland Court and have a hearing scheduled for May 3rd

We and our legal team believe the board s attempted clarification

is  
inconsistent  
with  
CWH s  
own  
Declaration  
of  
Trust  
and  
thus  
null  
and  
void  
as  
a  
matter  
of  
law  
Related  
and  
Corvex  
believe  
CWH s  
March  
1  
bylaw  
amendment  
is  
invalid  
and  
a  
desperate attempt to disenfranchise shareholders  
st

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Flawed RMR Structure and Poor Corporate Governance

Failed Maryland House Bill Amendment

Proposed amendment would have opened door to make it impossible to remove trustees without cause in many Maryland companies (regardless of voting threshold), even if shareholders had explicit right to do so in a company's charter

Similar to March 1st bylaw amendment, CWH couched proposed amendment as a clarification

We believe notion that amendment was a clarification is absurd, as existing Maryland law

expressly contemplates removal of staggered board without cause when provided for in a company's charter

as  
is  
unequivocally  
done  
in  
CWH's  
Declaration  
of  
Trust

CWH used deceptive letters (which were later withdrawn) from a conflicted attorney in an attempt to mislead Maryland senators into believing amendment had broad legal support and was ministerial,

when  
in  
fact  
it

had  
not  
even  
been  
discussed  
by  
key  
Maryland  
bar  
committee

(1)  
Fortunately for CWH shareholders and all shareholders of Maryland-based corporations and trusts,

the  
amendment  
quickly  
died  
once  
legislators  
became  
aware

of  
CWH's  
manipulative  
behavior and the clear fact that the amendment was substantive and not at all a clarification

Current  
trustees  
would  
rather

manipulate  
the  
Maryland  
legislative  
process  
and  
change  
the  
law  
than  
face  
their  
own  
shareholders

One  
of  
the  
Portnoys  
latest  
legal  
maneuvers

was  
a  
secret  
attempt  
(likely  
using  
CWH money) to insert an 11

th  
hour amendment into a Maryland House Bill  
(1)

The proposed amendment was not even discussed by the Corporation Law Committee of the Business Law Section of the Maryland State Bar Association, which typically reviews and comments on all changes to Maryland corporate and REIT law before changes are heard by the Governor.



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Flawed RMR Structure and Poor Corporate Governance  
April 12 Bylaw Amendment  
On  
April  
12,  
2013,  
CWH  
purported  
to

opt-in  
to  
Section  
3-803  
of  
the  
Maryland  
General  
Corporation Law, which allows Maryland companies to adopt a classified board (something  
CWH has had in place since 1986)  
CWH  
has  
taken  
the  
view  
that  
opting  
in  
to  
Section  
3-803  
enables  
them  
to  
unilaterally  
eliminate shareholders  
right to remove trustees without cause

We  
and  
our  
lawyers  
firmly  
believe  
that  
they  
are  
wrong  
In fact, CWH recently sought to amend Section 3-803 to clarify  
that a company opting-in to  
Section 3-803 could eliminate shareholders right to remove trustees without cause. The  
Maryland legislature did not approve the proposed amendment. Various senators noted  
during hearing that CWH's proposed amendment represented a substantive change in the  
law, not a clarification  
CWH's novel interpretation of Section 3-803 conflicts with 14 years of public filings by CWH,  
which not once mention the potential effects of opting into Section 3-803, notwithstanding  
extensive disclosure of Maryland law applicable to shareholder rights, and CWH's continuous  
reminder to shareholders that trustees can be removed without cause by a two-thirds vote  
CWH's latest bylaw amendment conflicts with 14 years of their own public  
disclosure

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Flawed RMR Structure and Poor Corporate Governance

No Shareholder Return on Investment

Trustees continue to spend on acquisitions and issue more shares  
despite poor shareholder

returns due to skewed incentives created by RMR's external management

Management has spent \$2.7 billion on acquisitions and capex since 2007 (over

2x

CWH's

entire

market

cap

(1)

), while CWH book value per share is essentially

flat

(1)

Market

cap

of

\$1.3

billion

based

on

a

closing

price

of

\$15.85

on

February

25,

2013,

the

day

prior

to

Related

and

Corvex's

first

public filing.

(2)

Historical book values calculated using SIR and GOV market values. Market cap and 2012 book value uses stock market price

(3)

Metric shown includes SIR.

'07-'12

'07-'12

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

CAGR

Cumulative

Book Value

(2)

\$2,198

\$2,217

\$2,259

\$2,702  
 \$2,816  
 \$3,086  
 7.0%  
 40.4%  
 Book Value per Share  
 \$36.11  
 \$34.68  
 \$35.66  
 \$37.53  
 \$33.24  
 \$36.82  
 0.4%  
 2.0%  
 Memo: Shares Outstanding  
 60.9  
 63.9  
 63.4  
 72.0  
 84.7  
 83.8  
 6.6%  
 37.6%  
 Gross Real Estate Assets  
 (3)  
 \$6,156  
 \$6,242  
 \$6,324  
 \$6,357  
 \$7,244  
 \$7,829  
 4.9%  
 27.2%  
 Cumulative  
 Net Acquisitions and CapEx  
 \$419  
 \$83  
 \$453  
 \$369  
 \$604  
 \$753  
 \$2,681  
 % of Recent Market Cap  
 31.6%  
 6.2%  
 34.1%  
 27.8%  
 45.5%  
 56.7%  
 201.9%

Total RMR Management Fees

\$59.7

\$63.2

\$62.6

\$62.2

\$69.5

\$77.3

\$394.6

% of Recent Market Cap

4.5%

4.8%

4.7%

4.7%

5.2%

5.8%

29.7%

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Flawed RMR Structure and Poor Corporate Governance

A Dinosaur

As the REIT industry grew rapidly during the 90s, the externally advised model became a dinosaur. The IPO wave of the 90s brought forth companies with top-notch managers/employees whose financial interests were strongly aligned with those of shareholders.

While

the

externally

advised  
structure  
remains  
the  
norm  
in  
the non-  
traded REIT world, where conflicts of interest run rampant, the Portnoy REITs stand  
out like a sore thumb in the publicly traded REIT domain.  
If  
the  
conflicts  
of  
interest  
are  
so  
detrimental  
to  
shareholders,  
why  
don't  
they  
and the  
Boards of the REITs terminate the advisory contract and staff the REIT with its own  
employees?  
With  
respect  
to  
the  
Portnoy  
REITs,  
a  
primary  
reason  
is  
that  
the  
corporate  
governance impediments are substantial. Staggered boards are a primary obstacle.  
Poison  
pills  
are  
another.  
In  
addition,  
the  
valuation  
gap  
between  
the



Portnoy  
companies  
and  
their  
REIT  
peers  
has  
usually  
been  
wide,  
but  
rarely  
wide  
enough to  
make the financial reward worthwhile for the vast effort required to enact change.

The  
Portnoy  
REITs

What  
It  
Means  
to  
be  
Uninvestable ,  
Green  
Street  
Advisors,  
March 1, 2013

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Flawed RMR Structure and Poor Corporate Governance

A Case Study in Skewed Incentives

How does a misalignment in incentives manifest itself in financial losses for

CWH

shareholders

and

profits

for

RMR?

Capital Investment  
\$10,000,000  
Equity Investment  
\$10,000,000  
Current Occupancy  
0.0%  
Financing at 60% LTV  
\$15,000,000  
New Occupancy  
80.0%  
Total Capital Investment  
\$25,000,000  
Incremental NOI  
\$2,000,000  
Incremental NOI (6% cap rate)  
\$1,500,000  
Less: Financing Cost (4.5%)  
(\$675,000)  
Equity Cash Flow  
\$825,000  
Return on Equity  
20.0%  
Return on Equity  
8.3%  
Incremental Fees to RMR  
Incremental Fees to RMR  
% of historical cost basis  
0.5%  
% of historical cost basis  
0.5%  
Incremental historical cost basis  
\$10,000,000  
Incremental historical cost basis  
\$25,000,000  
Incremental Fees to RMR  
\$50,000  
Incremental Fees to RMR  
\$125,000  
Capital Allocation Option "B"  
Capital Allocation Option "A"  
Acquire New Property at lower ROE  
Reinvest in Existing Property to Maximize ROE  
Which option would you have chosen?  
Which option do you think RMR chose?  
Is  
it  
any  
wonder  
that  
CWH s

stock  
is  
down  
43%  
over  
the  
past  
3  
years?

The case study below is based on extensive due diligence performed by Related on a specific vacant property in CWH's portfolio, which we believe management is unwisely looking to sell

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Refuting the Portnoys  
Spurious Claims

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Refuting the Portnoys

Spurious Claims

Shareholders are Being Asked to Relinquish Control

Existing trustees falsely claim Related and Corvex are asking shareholders to  
relinquish control

in fact it is totally the opposite

We

believe

our  
consent  
solicitation  
to  
remove  
the  
board  
will  
serve  
as  
a  
shareholder  
referendum  
on  
the  
current  
board  
of  
trustees  
and  
senior  
management  
and  
their  
value  
destructive  
behavior

Shareholders  
are  
not  
being  
asked  
by  
Related/Corvex  
to  
relinquish  
control  
of  
CWH  
in  
any  
way;  
they  
are  
being  
asked  
to  
take  
back

CWH  
from  
the  
grip  
of  
the  
Portnoys  
and  
RMR,  
and  
restore  
control  
to  
all  
CWH s  
shareholders

The only group at risk of losing control is RMR and the Portnoys, which we believe have used CWH as their own personal piggy bank for years  
Once the current trustees are removed, CWH is required to promptly call a special meeting for all shareholders to elect new trustees

At  
that  
time  
we  
hope  
and  
expect  
all  
CWH  
shareholders  
will  
work  
to  
collectively  
identify  
an  
independent  
slate  
of  
highly  
qualified  
nominees

including  
real  
estate  
industry  
veterans



with  
pristine  
credentials

that  
are  
prepared  
to  
work  
for  
the  
interests  
of  
all  
shareholders

We  
also  
hope  
and  
expect  
a  
newly  
elected  
board  
would  
adopt  
ISS  
and  
Glass  
Lewis  
corporate  
governance  
best  
practices,  
restoring  
appropriate  
shareholder  
rights  
for  
all  
CWH  
shareholders  
going  
forward

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Refuting the Portnoys

Spurious Claims

CWH Has a Strategic Plan

Existing trustees claim to have a strategic plan

Unfortunately, in our view the so-called strategic plan consists largely of capital recycling, without any path to actual value creation for shareholders

Creates

the

appearance  
of  
activity,  
but  
does  
not  
actually  
result  
in  
any  
progress

Only figures associated with strategic plan reference volume of activity, and make no mention of shareholder returns or value creation

Strategic  
plan  
continues  
management s  
historical  
practice  
of

buy  
high,  
sell  
low

capital  
allocation

The two key elements  
of the so-called strategic plan are:

Strategic Plan

Says:

We Believe Strategic Plan

Actually Means:

Improving Commonwealth's Financial  
Condition and Liquidity

Sell equity at a massive discount to repay debt  
trading at a premium, to give the appearance of  
changing capital structure (i.e. buy high, sell low)

Continued Repositioning of

Commonwealth's Property Portfolio

Sell vacant suburban properties at a massive  
discount and recycle proceeds to acquire fully  
occupied CBD properties at premium valuations  
(i.e. buy high, sell low)

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Refuting the Portnoys

Spurious Claims

CWH Will be Unable to Continue Normal Operations

The Portnoys have tried to paint a bleak picture of CWH upon removal of themselves

and

their

conflicted

trustees

a  
fictional  
picture  
of  
a  
company  
without leadership, unable to comply with basic regulatory obligations

These  
statements  
represent

a  
scare  
tactic  
employed  
by

current  
trustees  
in

a  
desperate  
attempt

to  
intimidate

CWH's  
shareholders;

nothing  
could

be  
further  
from

the  
truth

Upon removal of the current board, we are committed to put at the immediate disposal of CWH and all its shareholders all of our considerable resources, including highly qualified property and financial managers

Jim Lozier, former CEO and co-founder of the Archon Group L.P., has agreed to a potential interim CEO position

CBRE, the world's largest commercial real estate services firm, has agreed to provide interim

property  
management

services  
and

leasing  
services

to  
the

CWH  
portfolio  
as  
necessary

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Refuting the Portnoys

Spurious Claims

Change of Control

under Credit Agreement, Other Agreements

In connection with their scare tactics, current trustees have also emphasized

risk that a termination of RMR's agreements could lead to a change of

control

under CWH's credit agreements and other agreements

We, along with our financial advisor Deutsche Bank, have analyzed the Company's credit

agreements

Deutsche Bank has already given us highly confident letters for necessary refinancings which may arise under a change of control, positioning CWH for a smooth transition



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Refuting the Portnoys

Spurious Claims

Current Trustees and RMR Acting in Best Interests  
of CWH

Existing trustees claim they and RMR are acting in the best interests of CWH  
Based on what track record and what evidence?

Why would trustees acting in the best interests of shareholders pursue and even upsize  
an unnecessary, massively dilutive equity offering?

Why would trustees acting in the best interests of shareholders attempt to pass bylaw amendments to disenfranchise shareholders?

Why would trustees acting in the best interests of shareholders attempt to secretly pass a new Maryland law making it impossible to remove them?

Why would trustees acting in the best interests of shareholders make plans to potentially sell CWH s controlling stake in SIR at a discount to market rather than a premium?

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New Management Team and Strategy

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New Management Team and Strategy

New Strategic Plan

Internalize

management,

adopt

a

market

cost

structure,

and  
align  
management  
compensation  
with  
shareholder  
returns

no  
more  
skewed  
incentives

While corporate management will be replaced, we anticipate current property level employees will be hired to work at the new CWH

Amend  
existing  
Declaration  
of  
Trust  
and  
bylaws  
to  
conform  
to  
ISS  
and  
Glass  
Lewis  
best  
practices

no  
more  
shareholder  
disenfranchisement  
Cease  
all  
acquisition  
activity  
until  
CWH s  
stock  
price  
exceeds  
its  
NAV

no  
more

dilutive  
equity  
offerings  
and  
ignoring  
the  
views  
of  
shareholders

We believe reinvesting in CWH's existing portfolio can lead to a stabilized NOI of \$547 million, an increase of ~20% from the Company's LQA 4Q12 cash NOI  
Use excess cash flow to buy back CWH stock until the Company's stock price exceeds its NAV

no  
more  
buy  
high,  
sell  
low  
capital  
allocation  
Cease  
all  
related  
party  
transactions

no  
more  
self-dealing  
for  
benefit  
of  
the  
Portnoys  
Adopt  
best  
practices  
and  
manage  
the  
Company  
in  
ways  
which  
maximize  
long-term  
CWH

shareholder  
value,  
not  
fees  
paid  
to  
RMR

While a new board selected by all shareholders will ultimately determine the details of CWH's new strategic plan, we propose the following key elements as a starting point for the Company's new direction

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New Management Team and Strategy

About Related

Founded in 1972 by Stephen Ross, Related is amongst the most prolific and respected real estate developers, operators and investors in the nation

Owns and operates a portfolio valued at over \$15 billion including 5 million square feet of commercial space and over 40,000 apartment units

Over 2,000 employees located in Boston, Chicago, Dallas, Los Angeles, Miami, New York, San Francisco, Shanghai, Abu Dhabi and Sao Paulo

Experience with portfolios of assets in distressed or hostile situations, including:



-  
Several assets representing hundreds of millions of dollars in value in contested foreclosure or adversarial bankruptcy proceeding, including acting as agent for court appointed receivers between 2010-2012

-  
Portfolio of 32 REO properties comprised of 10,000 multifamily units on behalf of GSE  
Founded over 40 years ago, Related operates a real estate portfolio valued at over \$15 billion today including residential, office, mixed-use, and affordable properties

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New Management Team and Strategy

Potential Interim CEO

Mr. Lozier served as co-founder and CEO of the Archon Group L.P., a subsidiary of Goldman Sachs, from its formation in 1996 until 2012

Archon is an international real estate services and advisory company based in Dallas, TX

During Mr. Lozier's tenure at Archon, the company grew from 320 employees to 8,500

employees managing 36,000 assets with a gross value of approximately \$59 billion

Archon underwrote, acquired and asset managed real estate and real estate debt for

Goldman Sachs with a concentration in office, multi-family and limited service hospitality

Prior to the formation of Archon, Mr. Lozier was an employee of the J.E. Robert Company and had been responsible for managing the GS / JER joint venture for two years. Mr. Lozier directed the acquisition efforts of the joint venture between GS and JER from 1991-1995

Mr. Lozier could serve as interim CEO until the new board decides to hire a permanent CEO. As interim CEO, he would focus on transition of management services, continuity of financial reporting, and building out a permanent management team

Related/Corvex have identified a potential interim CEO, Jim Lozier, to help transition CWH to internal management.

Mr. Lozier is a 30+ year real estate industry veteran with impeccable credentials who has created significant value for equity holders during his career

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New Management Team and Strategy

About CBRE

CBRE Asset Services group provides property management, financial reporting and construction management to clients

CBRE

(1)

employs 42,000+ people in 430+ offices and manages more than 3.3 billion square feet of commercial property and corporate facilities across the globe

Successfully

managed  
transition  
of  
leasing  
/  
management  
services  
for  
1.2  
billion  
square  
feet  
of  
commercial properties in the U.S. over the previous nine years, including transitions done under  
significant time pressure  
(1)  
Employees,  
offices,  
and  
square  
footage  
under  
management  
includes  
CBRE  
affiliate  
offices.  
CBRE, the world's largest commercial real estate services firm, has agreed to  
provide interim property management and leasing services to the CWH  
portfolio as necessary



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Appendix

Valuation Summary

(1)

Includes value of SIR stake as of April 17, 2013.

(2)

Stabilized NOI of \$547 million.

(3)

Wholly-owned LQA GAAP NOI of \$487.3 million per CWH 4Q12 Supplemental.

(4)

Wholly-owned square feet per Company filings and Related / Corvex analysis.

(1)

With the removal of current trustees, we estimate an NAV per share of \$35 today (4/17/13) based on bottom-up property-by-property analysis, and a target stock price of \$44 or higher at 12/31/14

We believe NAV can be thought of as fair market value of the current portfolio, before benefit from any other value enhancing actions (which we believe are plentiful)

Valuation was led by Related, one of the most well respected real estate developers, operators, and investors in the U.S. with a 40 year history and a portfolio of over \$15 billion of real estate operating assets today

We believe CWH could trade at a stock price of \$44 or higher at 12/31/14 through internalization of management, operational turnaround, improved capital allocation, and multiple expansion

Stock Price

Related / Corvex

@ 2/25

NAV @ 4/17

Stock Price

\$15.85

\$34.92

% Change

--

120.3%

Cap Rate of Stabilized NOI

(2)

11.12%

7.66%

Cap Rate of LQA NOI

(3)

9.92%

6.83%

Price / LQA Normalized FFO

5.9x

13.0x

Price / GAAP Book Value per Share

0.43x

0.95x

Price / Square Foot

(4)

\$89

\$135

Dividend Yield @ Current \$0.25 / Qtr

6.31%

2.86%



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Appendix

Underwriting Methodology

Related and Corvex believe CWH's wholly owned real estate is worth \$7.1 billion today after removal of current trustees (compared to a cost basis of \$7.0 billion

and

implied

market

value

of

\$4.9  
billion  
as  
of  
2/25/13)  
based

on  
property-by-  
property underwriting

(1)  
CWH \$4.9 billion enterprise value calculated using SIR and GOV market value as of 2/25/13.

Related did not rely on book value and  
instead, did a bottoms up real estate  
valuation on 90% of the portfolio

Related analyzed market rental,  
vacancy and cap rate trends as  
well as market research reports

Related performed site visits,  
met with local brokers and had  
appropriate internal Related teams

review underwriting assumptions

Related used Gross Asset Value  
( GAV ) and Cap Rate Valuation  
methodologies to determine NAV per  
share.

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Appendix  
Underwriting Methodology (continued)  
The  
most  
extensive  
property  
level  
detail  
that

CWH provides is a Schedule 3 (accumulated depreciation schedule) produced at the end of every fiscal year. This report does not show the assets names or addresses and is merely a list of properties identified by an ID number. The following represents our underwriting methodology:

1. Associate each property ID in the Schedule 3 with an address, name and portfolio where appropriate
2. Remove any SIR spin-off properties (76 total) based on Schedule 1.1 of Form 8-K dated

3/31/12

3.

Account for any acquisitions and dispositions during 2012 and 2013

4.

Perform extended due diligence on 367 properties

Represents 90% of the portfolio's total SF

Represents 90% of the portfolio's total cost basis

5.

Extrapolate results to the rest of the portfolio

6.

Analyze market rental, vacancy and cap rate trends and meet with brokers, research comparable transactions and perform site visits to further improve property level assumptions

7.

Determine CWH's NAV per share based on gross asset value ( GAV ) and cap rate methodologies

We believe GAV is a more appropriate indicator of valuation because of the nature of CWH's portfolio

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Appendix  
How RMR is Paid  
Business management agreement

Requires  
CWH  
to  
pay  
RMR

at  
annual  
rate  
of  
0.7%  
of  
the  
historical  
cost  
basis  
of  
U.S.,

Canadian, and Puerto Rican investments for the first \$250 million of such investments  
and 0.5% thereafter  
1.0% fee level for investments outside the U.S., Canada, and Puerto Rico

Additionally, RMR is entitled to an incentive fee equal to 15% of the product of (i)  
weighted average fully diluted shares outstanding and (ii) the excess of FFO per share  
over FFO per share in the preceding fiscal year  
No incentive paid in recent years given continued FFO per share declines  
Property management agreement

Provides for fees equal to 3.0% of gross collected rents, and construction supervision  
fees equal to 5.0% of construction costs  
CWH is managed under two agreements with RMR (terminable by Company  
with 60 days notice), which generate steady fees based on gross historical cost  
basis and gross rents

'07-'12

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

Cumulative

Business Management Fees

\$31.0

\$33.4

\$33.6

\$34.7

\$39.2

\$43.6

\$215.6

Property Management Fees

28.7

29.8

29.0

27.5

30.3

33.7

\$179.0

RMR Management Fees

\$59.7

\$63.2

\$62.6

\$62.2

\$69.5

\$77.3

\$394.6

% of Recent Market Cap

4.5%

4.8%

4.7%

4.7%

5.2%

5.8%

29.7%

% of Rental Income

7.1%

8.4%

7.4%

7.3%

7.6%

7.5%



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Appendix  
CWH Related Party Transactions  
5 Year  
Related  
Party  
Transactions  
2008  
2009  
2010

2011  
2012  
Cumulative  
SNH  
\$346.8  
\$214.6  
\$374.1  
\$262.9  
\$1,198.3  
GOV  
395.3  
231.0  
626.3  
SIR  
400.0  
400.0  
AIC  
5.2  
5.3  
5.4  
6.7  
5.3  
28.0  
Total  
\$352.0  
\$615.2  
\$610.5  
\$269.6  
\$405.3  
\$2,252.6

Figures discussed in presentation per disclosure in CWH public filings. Figures above do not include fees paid to RMR and distributions from minority stakes, which would have the impact of increasing the amount of related party transactions.

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Appendix

Related & Corvex Overview

Related and Corvex collectively own 10.9 million shares of CWH (9.2% of shares outstanding)

Related Companies

Related Fund Management, LLC is an affiliate of Related Companies ( Related ), one of the most prominent privately-owned real estate firms in the United States

## Edgar Filing: Commonwealth REIT - Form DFAN14A

Formed 40 years ago, Related is a fully-integrated, highly diversified industry leader with experience in virtually every aspect of development, acquisitions, management, finance, marketing and sales

Related's existing portfolio of real estate assets, valued at over \$15 billion, is made up of best-in-class mixed-use, residential, retail, office and affordable properties  
Corvex Management

Value-based investing across the capital structure in situations with clearly identifiable catalysts

Active investing to create asymmetric risk/reward opportunities

13D investments since inception include AboveNet (acquired by Zayo in March 2012), Corrections Corporation of America (elected REIT status in February 2013), Ralcorp (acquired by ConAgra in November 2012), and ADT (Keith Meister joined Board in December 2012)

Additional Information Regarding the Consent Solicitation

In connection with their solicitation of written consents, Corvex Management LP and Related Fund Management, LLC have filed a definitive written consent solicitation statement with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (the SEC) to solicit written consents from shareholders of Commonwealth REIT. **Investors and security holders are urged to read the definitive written consent solicitation statement and other relevant documents when they become available, because they contain important information regarding the consent solicitation.** The definitive written consent solicitation statement and all other relevant documents are available, free of charge, on the SEC's website at [www.sec.gov](http://www.sec.gov).

The following persons are participants in connection with the written consent solicitation of the Company's shareholders: Corvex Management LP, Keith Meister, Related Fund Management, LLC, Related Real Estate Recovery Fund GP-A, LLC, Related Real Estate Recovery Fund GP, L.P., Related Real Estate Recovery Fund, L.P., RRERF Acquisition, LLC, Jeff T. Blau, Richard O. Toole and David R. Johnson. Information regarding the participants in the consent solicitation and a description of their direct and indirect interests, by security holdings or otherwise, to the extent applicable, is available in the definitive written consent solicitation statement filed with the SEC on April 10, 2013 and Supplement No. 1 thereto filed on April 12, 2013.













